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Reform  programs  call for more  prudential  supervision  of finan-
cial institutions but fewer restrictions  on interest rates, the
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ate macroeconomic  framework,  without  which  reform  efforts
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The recent upsurge of concern with financial  But insofar as the relative cost and availabil-
sector policy issues in developing countries  ity of credit are concemed, the typical reform
arises primarily from three characteristics of  program calls for a reducdon in govemment
their financial systems:  control, and tries to broaden the range of options
for finance.  Called for are increases in, and
Many of the financial institutions in devel-  uldmately liberalization of, interest rates, as is a
oping countries are extremely unsound.  reduction in the scope and severity of restric-
tions on bank lending and financial innovation
* There is often excessive control over  generally.  A reduced burden of taxation,
interest rates and the direction of credit, amount-  implicit and explicit, of the financial system is
ing to repression of the financial systems.  often required.
* The domination by banks of the financial  Many needed financial sector reforms are of
system in many countries has led to a need for  an institutional nature requiring the acquisition
institution-building to enrich the range of  of scarce skills.  For instance, development
services that the financial sector can provide.  finance institutions may need to reconsider their
fundamental objectives and their entire method
The typical financial sector reform package  of operating.  These changes take time to
involves policy changes to increase the power of  become effective, and it is not clear that the
centralized decisionmaking in some areas and to  typical quick-disbursing policy-based operation
reduce it in others.  is the ideal medium for effecting them.
For pnidential regulation and supervision,  Experience has shown the importance of the
reforms seek strengthened information systems,  links between financial sector policies and per-
stronger and more detailed regulations, and  formance and the macroeconomic situation.
closer credit supervision. At the level of the  Without an adequate degree of macreeconomic
intermediaries, reforms seek improved proce-  stability, financial sector reforms can fail, with
dures, some of which (credit policies, loan  serious consequences. Therefore the planning of
review, and management information systems)  a financial sector reform must be predicated on
are natural complements to improvements at the  an appropriate macro-policy framework.
central level.
This paper is a product of the Financial Policy and Systems Division, Country
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wFINANCIAL  SECTZ REFORMS  TN  ADJUSTMENT  PROGRAMS
1  Why  Financial  Sector  Reforms?
The recent  upsurge  if  concern  with financial  sector  policy  issues  in
developing  countries  arises  primarily  from  three  characteristics  of their
financial  systems.
First,  many financial  institutions  in developing  countries  are
extremely  unsound.
Second,  there  is  often  excessive  control  over  interest  rates  and  the
direction  of credit,  amounting  to  repression  of the  financial  sys-
tems.
Third,  in  many  countries  the  financial  system  is  dominated  by deposit
money  banks. This suggests  a  need  for institution  building  to  enrich
the  range  of services  which  the  financial  sector  can  provide.
Financial  sector  adjustment  loans  (FSAL's)  are  a  recent  innovation
for  the  World  Bank. Up to  mid 1988  there  had  been  ur loans  so designated,
one  each  to  Argentina  and  Ecuador  and  two  to  Turkey,  and  there  has  been one
'trade  and  financial  sector  adjustment"  loan  to  Jamaical. Financial  reform
has  also  been  a  major  component  of  a few  structural  adjustment  loans,  notably
SAL's  IT  and  III  to  Chile  and  the  Economic  Recovery  Loan  to the  Philippines.
Changes  in  financial  policies  have  also  been incorporated  in the  Bank's
financial  intermediation  loans  (i.e.  loans  intermediated  through  financial
institutions  in  borrowing  countries);  these  have  a longer  history,  but the
scope  of  policy  reform  has  been  more  limited.  Financial  sector  loans  now in
1 The  loans  to  Argentina  (actually  termed  a  banking  sector  adjustment  loan)
and  Ecuador,  and  the  second  to  Turkey  were approved  in Fiscal  Year (FY)88.
The  Jamaican  loan  was in  FY87  and  the  first  to  Turkey  in FY86.
1preparation  include  Ghana,  Nepal,  Kenya,  Hungary,  and  Nigeria,  and  further
loans  are  possible  in  a number  of other  countries. However,  the  empirical
evidence  on loan  conception,  implementation  and  effects  is still  limited  in
this  area.
1.1  Soundness,  Prudential  Regulation  and  Supervision
In  possibly  the  majority  of financial  systems  in  developing  coun-
tries  institutions  covering  a sizable  fraction  of the  market  are techni-
cally  insolvent. In a  smaller  number  of countries  many  institutions,  large
and  small,  have lost  their  capital  several  times  over. This  phenomenon  is
observed  in  both  public-owned  and  private  institutions,  but especially  in
the  former.
As with  most  bank failures  in the  industrial  countries,  poor  qual-
ity  of  bank  management  - including  fraud  and insider  abuse  - has  been  at
the  root  of  many failures  in  developing  countries 2. Thus,  for  examp.e,
managements  have  allowed  undue  concentration  of risks  in  certain  sectors,
or to certain  individuals.  Lending  to  uncreditworthy  clients  at the  behest
of directors,  or  of government,  has  also  been  a factor. In  many  countries
close  ownership  links  between  banks  and  their  borrowing  clients  have  been
at the  root  of the  problem. A special  case  of this  is  when  public  banks
lend  to  public  clients.
There  have  also  been  causes  external  to the  financial  system. 3
Unforeseen  macroeconomic  shocks  have  upset  the  calculations  on the  basis  of
which  loans  had  been  advanced,  leaving  the  borrowers  unable  to service  the
loans. In  particular,  large  devaluations  have sometimes  created  difficul-
ties,  as when  the  business  of  many  borrowers  is import  related  or they  have
incurred  dollar  debts,  or  when a  bank  has  held a foreign  exchange  exposure.
Deflationary  policies  generally  result  in  a deterioration  of the  quality  of
banks'  loan  portfolios.  Trade  liberalization  measures  also  weaken  the
2 For  an assessment  of the  causes  of  bank failure  in.  che  US,  see  US Govern-
ment,  1988.
3 It is extremely  hard  to assign  relative  weights  to internal  ane  external
causes  of financial  institution  failure. Macroeconomic  disturbances  often
hasten  the  demise  of a  weak financial  institution  and  may  be  mistaken  for  the
underlying  causes. Conversely  an institution  weakened  by external  shocks  may
be particularly  prone  to deteriorating  quality  of  management  (De  Juan,  1987).
2ability  to  repay  of those  previously  protected  by tariffs  or other  trade
barriers. Thus  bank failures  may  be entailed  by some  aspects  of desirable
macroeconomic  adjustment  programs. Not  all  of these  problems  could  have
been forestalled  by adequate  supervision  and  prudential  regulation,  includ-
ing  adequate  accounting  and  auditing  standards,  but some  could  have  been,
and  the  cost  oZ dealing  with the  problem  promptly  would  have  been far
lower.
Furthermore,  an inadequate  regulatory  and  supervisory  framework  is
a barrier  to effective  financial  liberalization,  because  liberalization
places  different,  and  in  many  respects  heavier,  demands  on  prudential  regu-
lation  and  supervision  than  a directed  credit  system 4. Liberalized  finan-
cial  markets  also  require  different  skills  in the  banking  institutions  from
those  needed  in  markets  where  interest  rates  and  credit  flows  are  heavily
controlled.
In  most cases,  if  banks  collapse,  the  potential  losses  to  depos-
itors  are  ultimately  indemnified  by the  state,  with  adverse  budgetary
impact. This is  because  of the  perceived  need  to  preserve  confidence  and
avoid  a flight  from  deposits. But  the  consequences  of  bank insolvency  go
beyond  this. Distressed  banks  and  borrowers  can  impede  the  access  to
credit  of good  borrowers  and  sound  investment  projects. While  the  bank's
difficulty  goes  unrecognized,  management  continues  to lend  to non-
performing  borrowers  in  the  hope of  some  reversal  of their  fortunes. To
Aupport  this  unsustainable  behavior  they  may  bid  up interest  rates  in  a
scramble  for  liquidity,  to  levels  well  above  the  likely  return  on invest-
ments. New lending  projects  are  not  entertained  by banks  in these  circum-
stances;  nor can  finance  be raised  outside  the  banking  system  at a
reasonable  cost  even  by worthwhile  investment  projects  because  of the
liquidity  squeeze. Repositioning  of the  economy's  productive  capacity  to a
new set  of relative  prices  or to an export-oriented  policy  is thus  inhib-
ited;  meanwhile  the  volume  of "paper  assets"  and  the  government's  potential
liability  mushrooms 5.
4  Dooley  and  Matheson,  1987,  Diaz-Alejandro,  1985.
5 For  the  consequences  of  widespread  insolvency  see  Hinds,  1988.
3The  correction  of insolvency  problems  in the  banking  system  is
thus  an  urgent  task. Its  character  is  more that  of crisis  management  than
of a long-term  development  effort. Nevertheless  the  task  must  be accom-
plished  with a  view to the  longer  run  if  the  problems  are  not to  recur.
Certain  "infrastructural"  components  are  needed  so restructure  a banking
system. For  example,  accounting  and  anditing  standards  must col.form  with
generally  accepted  principles.  A system  of loan  classification  by quality
is  necessary  so that  capital  inadequacy  can  be corrected  and that  there  can
be early  warning  of any  future  problems. Adequate  systems  of prudential
regulation  and  supervision  must  be installed  to  ensure  the  health  of the
restructured  system. To implement  these  may require  legal  and institu-
tional  changes  in  the  relationship  between  banks  and  their  regulators  and,
more generally,  between  lenders  and  borrowers.
1.2  Financial  Repression
Excessive  regulation  of interest  rates,  unduly  heavy  taxation  of
financial  intermediation  and  extensive  direction  of credit  severely  inhib-
its  the  effectiveness  of financial  systems  in  many  developing  countries.
Such  repressed  financial  systems  may  not,  for  example,  offer  savers  an
asset  which  can  be expected  to  retain  its  real  value  over  time. Financial
intermediaries  will  then  be little  used,  with savers  relying  on relatively
unproductive  assets  or capital  flight. 6
The  disposition  of such  funds  as are  made  available  to  financial
institutions  may  also  be constrained:  intermediaiies  may  not  be able  to
avoid  lending  to sectors  and  projects  where  the  risk  of failure  outweighs
the  likely  returns  nor,  conversely,  to expand  credit  to the  most  promising
projects. In  many developing  countries  over  half  of  bank credit  is
directed,  and  in some  all  is.  The  productivity  of aggregate  investment  in
the  economy  may thus  be seriously  impaired,  resulting  in  wasted  resources
and slower  growth. Central  direction  of  credit  allocation  might,  from
certain  perspectives,  result  in  a good  distribution  of credit  even  though
6  There  is  some  evidence  that  countries  with  repressed  financial  systems  grow
more slowly  and  that  their  incremental  output/capital  ratio  are  low: see
Gelb,  1989.
4it  does  not  take  advantage  of the  informational  gains  offered  by a decen-
tralization  of credit  decisions. 7 But  by withholding  responsibility  from
the  financial  institutions  it tends  to  weaken  the  process  of loan  recovery
and  can  wreak  havoc  with  the  financial  viability  of the  intermediaries.
In the  absence  of such  controls,  and  given  a reasonable  degree  of
macro-stability,  the  financial  sector  could  be performing  the  important
role  of assessing  the  potential  of different  projects  and  adjudicating
between  them. Because  of the  preva.  ace  of credit  direction,  credit
assessment  skills  may  not  be deve'1oped  anywhere  in  the  economy.
Some  of these  regulations  may  have  been  instituted  with  a view  to
avoiding  the  risks  of  unduly  vigorous  competition,  or to ensuring  that
"priority"  borrowers  are  adequately  served. But it  is now  quite  generally
recognized  that  the  regulations  of  many  countries  often  go  beyond  what is
necessary  or  desirable  and  in  the  end  not  only  result  in  a diminished
quantity  of  misdirected  credit,  but  also  present  prudential  risks  of their
own.  The  spreads  obtainable  on directed  credit  are  often  insufficient,  and
they  may  limit  portfolio  diversification  of the  banks.
In  most  cases  repression  has a  pronounced  fiscal  dimension. The
financial  system  has  traditionally  been  an administratively  convenient
source  of tax  revenue.  A zero  or low  rate  of remuneration  on  high reserve
requirements  (often  in  excess  of one-fifth  of deposits  aid  occasionally
approaching  two-thirds)  has also  contributed  to the  fiscal  burden  on finan-
cial intermediation  and  to  widening  the  spread  between  borrowing  and  lend-
ing  rates  in  many developing  countries.  The  total  tax  burden  levied  on
financial  systems  in  developing  countries  is  often  as  high  as two  to three
percent  of GDP,  and  sometimes  as  high  as seven  or eight  percent  of GDP.
1.3  The  Non-bank  Financial  Sector
In  most  developing  countries  the  financial  system  is dominated  by
banks,  with comparatively  little  by way  of  non-bank  intermediation  includ-
ing  money  and  stock  markets. If not  too  heavily  regulated,  banks  can
perform  many of the  most  important  functions  of a financial  system:  they
7 For  a discussion  of this  see  Cho,  1988.
5eatn  provide  a safe  and  liquid  repository  for  savings,  they  can  operate  an
efficient  payments  mechanism,  they  can  provide  the  necessary  financir.g  for
trade. However,  when it  comes  to other  financial  services,  such  as financ-
ing  of long-term  industrial  development  (by  debt  or  equity)  or the  provi-
sion  of  high-yielding  long-term  savings  media,  the  performance  of  banks  has
often  been questioned. It is  widely  believed  that  additional  institutions
are  needed  to complete  the  picture  and  ensure  the  maximum  contribution  of
the  financial  sector  to  economic  development  --  as  well as to  stimulate  the
banks  by competing  with them.
The  Bank  Group's  main  focus  in this  area  has  been  on the  develop-
ment of  capital  markets  and  money  markets.
Capital  markets  are  desirable  in that  they  can  give  investors
access  to long-term  funds  and  equity. Long-term  loans  are  suitable  for
financing  investments  with  a long  gestation  period  and  whose  returns  will
only  materialize  over  a long  period. Equity  capital  is  desirable  for
financing  risky  investments:  it  allows  the  investor  c^  go through  a  bad
patch  without  the  fear  of  bankruptcy  and  the  real  disruption  which  that
would  cause. Banks  in  most  countries  are  reluctant  to commit  themselves  to
long-term  lending  or equity  investment 8, considering  that  their  own  liabi-
lities  are fixed,  and  generally  short-term  in  nature. There  is  also  con-
cern  that  industrial  equity  bases  are  insufficient  in  many developing
countries  to  provide  a robust  basis  for  long-term  growth. 9 From  the
saver's  point  of view,  equity  and  long-teem  investments  can  offer  a  higher
expected  return,  with  maturities  matched  to the  saver's  own  needs. An
effective  capital  market  can thus  result  in greater  mobilization  of
resources  and  more  productive  investment.
Money  markets  represent  the  short-term  end  of capital  markets:
their  development  allows  large  firms  and  institutions  to satisfy  their
short  term  borrowing  and  lending  needs  without  requiring  the  intermediation
of  banks;  this  can improve  efficiency  and  cut  costs.
8  And in  some  countries  banks  are  prohibited  from  holding  equity.
9 It appears  that  corporations  in  developing  countries  often  have  higher
debt/equity  ratios  than  those  in  the  "developed"  countries,  apparently  due  to
low  profit  retentions.
6But the  emergence  of a successful  capital  market  requires,  besides
reasonable  macro-stability,  the  development  of  an adequate  regulatory
framework  to limit  fraud  and  prevent  conflicts-of-interest  and  ensure  ade-
quate  disclosure.  Without  thi&  the  market  will  be distrusted  by savers,
who individually  are  unable  to assess  the  probity  and  creditworthiness  of
borrowers. This  third  area  of  bank involvement  is thus  primarily  an
institution-building  activity.
1.4  Financial  Intermediation  Loans.
The  Bank's  involvement  in  financial  sector  issues  is  not  confined
to  adjustment  lending. Of quantitatively  greater  importance  have  been
operations  involving  the  use  of domestic  financial  institutions  to  on-lend
Bank funds  to final  borrowers. The  first  loans  of this  type  were  channeled
through  specialized  development  finance  institutions  (DFIs),  some  of  which
were  established  specifically  or  primarily  for  this  purpose,  often  with
Bank  involvement.  Over  150  DFIs  around  the  world  have  been  used  by the
Bank  for  industrial  sector  lending  alone. Over  time  a larger  share  of
loans  has  been  channeled  through  the  commercial  banking  sector  via some
"apex"  institution  (often  the  Central  Bank).
This lending  responded  to a  perceived  deficiency  in the  provision
of long-term  finance  and  was seen  as the  only  way to reach  smaller,  pri-
vate,  borrowers  In the  industrial  (and  agricultural)  sectors. During  the
last  few  years  industrial  lending  through  financial  intermediaries  has
averaged  about  $2  billion  per  annum,  and  this  type  of lending  is likely  to
increase.
Unfortunately,  many  of the  loans  made  by the  DFIs  did  not  perform
satisfactorily,  and  by the  start  of the  1980s  the  parlous  financial  state
of  many  of these  DFIs  had  become  apparent. As many  as  one-third  had severe
portfolio  problems,  due  to a  variety  of  macro  and  sectoral  causes  and  to
poor lending  procedures.  A review  in  1985  concluded  that  about  half of the
DFI's  were in reasonable  condition,  but that  only  about  10 - 15  were suffi-
ciently  profitable  to turn  to the  market  for  financing. 10
10  World  Bank,  1985.
7The  expansion  of  World  Bank  lending  activities  to include  a  wider
range  of intermediaries  (notably  the  commercial  banks)  was an attempt  to
reach  a  wider  range  of clients. But  it  also  served  to  sidestep  the  serious
portfolio  problems  in  many  of the  development  banks. The  doubtful  sound-
ness  of  many  banking  systems  raises  questions,  however,  about  the  alloca-
tion  of resources  intermediated  by the  commercial  banks  as  well,  and  also
about  the  ability  of these  banks  to  assess  credit  risk.
To the  extent  that  intermediated  lendiig  operations  have included
general  financial  policy  conditions,  they  have  been  largely  confined  to
interest  rate  reform,  usually  involving  the  raising  of rates  on subsidized
lines. This  often  reflects  concern  that  other,  heavily  subsidized,  lines
of credit  would  undercut  demand  for  the  Bank-financed  credit  lines  and
prevent  the  loans  from  disbursing.  As is suggested  by the  prevalence  of
repeat  loans  to intermediaries  with  poor  loan  recovery  records,  the  sol-
vency  of the  intermediaries,  their  managerial  capabilities  and  their  crec
processes  have  often  received  little  attention,  although  these  aspects  have
now begun  to  be addressed  more  seriously.
2 The  Content  of Adjustment  Policy  Packages
2.1  The  Prudential  Framework  and  Bank  Restructuring
The  key  elements  of  policy  typically  required  for  restoring  financial  sys-
tems  to a solvent  state  are:
1)  Measures  to  determine  the  state  of the  banks'  portfolios  and
the  necessary  provisions  and  write-offs.  These  measures  typically
include  the  strengthening  of  accounting  and  auditing,  implementing
external  audits,  and  classifying  the  portfolio  according  to loan
quality. Legal  changes  to facilitate  the  intervention  of regu-
lators  may  also  be needed.
2) For  the  banks  less  severely  affected,  implementing  provisioning
rules;  for  the  weaker  ones,  a  cleaning  up of the  loan  portfolio
(possibly  transferring  bad  loans  to  a special  facility),  instal-
ling  new  management,  recapitalizing  and  reducing  costs  or merging
if  a satisfactory  business  plan  ean  be developed,  or  else
liquidation.
83)  For  the  system,  establishing  an improved  regime  of  bank  super-
visiona  together  with  a regulatory  regime  which  will ensure  timely
provisioning  against  losses  and  provide  information  to  both  bank
management  and  the  regulators.  This  will  usually  require  an over-
haul of the  accounting  and  auditing  rules  and  systems,  of rules
for  portfolio  classification  and  for  the  treatment  of  unpaid
interest. Measures  to  permit  a  credible,  flexible,  response  by
regulators  m4.j  also  be needed,  for  example,  the  introduction  of
"cease  and  desist"  orders  to permit  a graduated  tightening  of con-
ditions,  and  the  creation  of a  deposit  insurance  corporation  (not
only  to insure  depositors  but especially  to free  the  central  bank
from  the  task  of intervening  banks,  which  is  extraneous  to its
main  function).  Another  area  in  which  changes  may  be needed  is
the  law  concerning  loan  recovery.
itg&  1.  These  measures,  though  apparently  prosaic,  constitute  a
vital  part  of the  process. They  may  amount  to a  veritable  cultural  revolu-
tion  in  the  way in  which  the  financial  system  and  the  corporate  sector
interact. Adequate  accounting  and  auditing  constitute  the  information
infrastructure  needed  for  financial  markets  to operate  well,  in the  sense
that  claims  on real  assets  are  able  to  be properly  valued. In  most  devel-
oping  countries,  this  infrastructure  is sadly  lacking.
§Sten  &  Why  are  insolvent  banks  not  simply  allowed  to fail? Pre-
serving  depositor  confidence  is  considered  important  for  two  main reasons.
First,  if  depositors  do not  have  confidence  in  the  banking  system,  the
potential  for  resource  mo'ilization  will  be severely  limited,  and  the  effi-
ciency  and  convenience  gains  therefrom  will  be accordingly  diminished.
Second,  a  wave  of depositor  nervousness  may lead  to a  bank  run.  Runs  which
result  in  bank  managements  making  forced  liquidations  of assets  can  be most
disruptive  to the  economy  and  represent  a significant  set-back  to  growth
efforts. Even  if  a  bank  run is  forestalled  by closure  of the  bank  or  banks
concerned,  this  in  itself  impedes  the  operation  of the  payments  system  and
disrupts  economic  activity. For  these  reasons  most,  though  not  all,  gov-
ernments have  arranged  for  at least  some  depositors  to  be indemnified  from
loss  when  banks  fail. Mostly  this  has  been  an AZ  os_t  indemnity,  but some
countries  have  explicit  deposit  insurance  schemes.
9For  various  reasons,  an explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  may  be
preferable  to an implicit  guarantee  by the  state. Establishment  of such  a
scheme  has  formed  part  of some  adjustment  programs, 11 and  where  this  has
been the  case,  the  insurance  agency  has  had functions  beyond  paying  out
depositors  of failed  banks. In  particular,  the  agency  can  intervene  in
banks  identified  as in serious  difficulties;  this  allows  the  central  bank,
which  might  otherwise  be the  only  agency  equipped  to  undertake  the  work,  to
concentrate  on policy  as it  affects  the  continuing  banks.
The task  of the  intervening  agency,  whether  it  be a deposit  insur-
ance  agency  or  not, is  to  decide  whether  the  failed  bank  should  be liq-
uidated,  or  whecher  it is realistic  and  worthwhile  to  consider  a restart
with  a capital  injection. It is  essential  to introduce  new  management;  in
the initial,  transition  phase  this  might  come  from  the  intervening  agency,
but these  should  be replaced  by outsiders  as soon  as  possible. The  next
stage  is  to identify  the  non-performing  parts  of the  portfolio  and  separate
these  from  the  remainder  of the  banks  assets. If left  with  bank  manage-
ment,  the  job  of salvaging  whatever  can  be obtained  from  a large  block  of
non-performing  loans,  could  hamper  a successful  restart  of the  banks'
operations.1 2 A restart  can  only  be contemplated  in the  context  of a
carefully  worked-out  business  plan  probably  involving  considerable  reforms
to the  internal  procedures  and  policies  of the  bank.  Invariably  a substan-
tial  reduction  in  staff  and  branch  expenses  will  be required. It  may  be
quite  some  time  before  the  rehabilitated  bank is in  a position  to  operate
independently  (in  the  case  of a  public-owned  bank)  or  be bought  by private
interests.  An important  consideration  in this  area  is that  the  financial
restructuring  should  not include  anything  for  the  former  shareholders:  it
is  banks (or  their  depositors)  rather  than  bankers  which  are "bailed  out-
n 13
11 For  example,  SAL  II  to Chile. In this  case  a separate  Superintendency  of
Banks  already  existed,  but there  was  no formal  deposit  insurance  system.
12  The  task  of recovering  bad loans  was  left  with  the  banks  in  Chile,  but
given  to a special  Trust  in  the  Philippines.
13 In  some  cases  debt-relief  programs  may  also  assist  borrowers,  as in  Chile
where  loans  were reprogrammed  to reduce  interest  rates  and  extend  terms,  and
preferential  exchange  rates  were introduced  after  devaluation.  This  may  be
done  to avoid  a  massive  sell-off  of  assetL  which  would  further  reduce  their
prices  and  add  to the  burden  of  bailing  out  the  system.
10Whether  liquidation  or rehabilitation  is  decided  upon,  the  protec-
tion  of depositors  is costly. Even  in  those  countries  where  a deposit
insu.rance  scheme  has  been in  operation,  the  fund  built  up with the
insurance  premia  is  rarely  sufficient  to  meet  the  deficits  which  emerge  in
the  course  of a  major  crisis. In  most  cases  the  cost  falls  directly  or
indirectly  on the  government.  A cost  borne  in  the  first  instance  by the
central  bank  eventually  tends  to fall  back  on to the  budget,  and  must  be
managed  and  spread  out  over  time  so that  it  does  not lead  to an excessively
inflationary  expansion  of  domestic  credit. Part  of the  counterpart  funds
generated  by a policy  based  loan  disbursed  against  general  imports  can  be
earmarked  for  capitalization  of the  insurance  scheme,  as in  Turkey  FSAL  II.
SteR 3.  In order to avoid a recurrence of bank failures there is
invariably  a  need to  strengthen  prudential  regulation  and  supervision.
Adjustment  programs  typically  recognize  this  by proposing  an increase  in
the  number  and  quality  of  bank inspectors  to allow  an adequate  frequency
and  depth  of on-site  inspections  of  bank  management  and  portfolios. There
is  usually  also  scope  for  improvements  in  the  procedures  for  off-site
review  and  analysis  by the  bank  regulators  of returns  made  by banks. Many
problems  could  have  been  avoided  by strict  adherence  to formal  procedures
for  loan  diversification,  for  loan  classification,  for  non-accrual  of
interest  and  for  provisioning  of non-performing  loans. Establishment  of
such  procedures,  which  should  also  ensure  that  problem  loans  are  not  con-
cealed  by allowing  delinquent  borrowers  to  roll  over  unpaid  interest  into
new  loans,  is  also  part  of the  typical  policy  package.14
2.2  Freeing-up  the  Financial  System
The  policy  agenda  for  removing  excessive  regulation  of interest
rates  and  credit  allocation  includes  some  or  all  of the  following  features:
- increase  in  controlled  interest  rates  to ensure  that  deposit
rates  are  positive  in  real  terms.
- removal  of controls  on  maximum  deposit  interest  rates.
14  The introduction  of standardized  accounting  and  external  audit  was a  key
condition  of the  1986  Turkish  financial  sector  operation.
11- removal  of all interest  rate  controls.
- withdrawal  of interest  subsidies  and  cross-subsidies.
- reduction  in the  complexity  of sectoral  credit  targets  and  the
degree  to  which  they  differ  from  what  would  be the  uncontrolled
outcome.
- removal  of bank-by-bank  credit  ceilings,  or of overall  credit
ceilings  in  favor  of  broad  instruments  of  monetary  control.
- removal  of  prohibition  on commercial  banks  from  activities  such
as  underwriting  or investing  in  private  corporate  securities.
- ensuring  that  barriers  to  entry  into  banking  are  no more  than  is
required  for  prudential  reasons  (though  in  some  cases  an
increase  in  capital  and  other  requirements  is  needed  for  pre-
cisely  those  reasons).1 5, 16.
- reduction  in fiscal  or  quasi-fiscal  burdens  on the  financial
sector  such  as those  caused  by low  remuneration  of  heavy  reserve
requirements.
- liberalization  of  exchange  controls.
All  of these  measures  have the  general  objective  of improving  the
effectiveness  of the  financial  sector's  performance  in  mobilizing  and  allo-
15 The  procedures  for  restructuring  or liquidation  of insolvent  banks  can  be
seen  as a  parallel  reduction  in the  barriers  to  exit.
16 Reducing  entry  barriers  can  actually  strengthen  the  banking  system  in
cases,  such  as Chile,  the  Philippines  and  Turkey,  where  it  has  been  dominated
by industrial-financial  groups  relying  too  much on  within-group  lending. In
1980  the  Philippines  offered  universaL  status  to  banks  with sufficiently
diversified  ownership,  and  the  entry  of foreign  shareholding  partners  was
encouraged. The  success  of this  measure  can  be  debated;  ovnership  of many
Philippine  banks  remains  dominated  by family  groups,  though  the  leavening  of
outside  shareholders  may  have  had  beneficial  effects.
12cating  resources,  by using  broad  market  signals  wherever  possible. As
noted  below,  the  timing  of liberalization  and  its  extent  are  Sometimes
debatable  issues,  especially  when financial  reforms  interact  with  other
reforms  or  macroeconomic  imbalances.  Also,  the  extent  to  which  reliance  on
market  signals  in  otherwise  suboptimal  environments  is  wholly  adequate  in
meeting  development  needs  for  credit  is  still  disputed  (though  it  may  be
argued  that  the  allocation  of resources  to  desirable  uses is  better  dealt
with  by fiscal  means  than  by credit  allocation).  In  practice,  and  for  a
variety  of reasons,  most  countries  choose  to  retain  some  degree  of control
over  financial  resource  allocation  and  some  degree  of subsidy  in their
financial  systems. Bank  programs  often  focus  on reducing  the  most  egre-
gious  deviations  from  a  market  configuration,  such  as the  prevalence  of
credit  at  negative  real  interest  rates,  or at rates  below  those  available
on deposits  which  encourages  the  substitution  of  borrowed  for  own  funds.
No uniform  approach  has  been  adopted  to the  ideal  regime  of taxa-
tion  of financial  intermediation.  Such  taxes  add  to the  wedge  between
borrowing  and  lending  rates  thereby  contributing  to inefficiency  in  the
allocation  of resources. It  should  be emphasized  that,  where  inadequacy  of
capital  is  a  major  constraint  to  development,  distortions  of this  type  may
be more  severe  than  in capital-rich  countries. For  this  reason,  a reduc-
tion  in financial  sector  taxation  is  often  a priority  in financial  sector
reform. At the  same  time,  it  could  happen  that  undue  zeal  in  eliminating
fiscal  burdens  on the  sector  might  result  in  undue  taxation  elsewhere  in
the  economy. A comparison  of the  amount  of indirect  tax  collected  with the
value  added  of the  financial  sector  gives  some  basis  for  comparing  tax
burdens  across  sectors. So far  as tax  design  is  concerned,  it is  desirable
that  the  tax  should  not  be linked  to  nominal  interest  receipts  in
inflation-prone  countries,  otherwise  it  may quickly  grow  in importance  and
contribute  to  a severe  widening  of interest  rate  spreads  if inflation  and
nominal  interest  rates  rise  sharply.l 7
17  This  happened,  for  example,  in  the  Philippines  where,  without  any  change
in tax  rates  the  burden  of the  tax  on gross  receipts  of financial  institu-
tions  approximately  tripled  in 1984. The  remuneration  of large  reserve
requirements  at fixed  low  rates  has  a similar  impact  as market  rates
increase.
132.3  Capital  Market  Development
Capital  market  development  typically  involves  four  main  areas  of
policy. First,  legislative:  establishing  an adequate  regulatory  framework
for  both  primary  and  secondary  markets  so that  a  variety  of securities  can
be sold  with adequate  requirements  for  systematic  accounting  and  disclosure
of accounts,  and  protection  of  minority  interests. 18 Second,  taxation:
reducing  differences  between  the  effective  rate  of taxation  applying  to
different  types  of security  in  order  to reduce  fiscal  disincentives,
especially  to the  use  of equity  and  long-term  debt. 19 Third,  technical
assistance  and  training  in  the  setting  up of  necessary  institutions  and
intermediaries.  Fourth,  liquidity:  ensuring  an institutional  framework  for
providing  adequate  liquidity  to the  market.  This  might,  for  example,
include  increased  authority  for  banks  to  participate  in  securities  markets,
a  measure  which  poses  problems  both of  prudential  regulation  and  potential
conflicts  of interest. 20
3 Problems  and Issues  for  Financial  Reforms
3.1  Interaction  with  Other  Adjustment  Programs
Major  problems  emerged  with  the  financial  sector  liberalization
experiments  of the  1970s  which  occurred  in the  Southern  Cone.  These  may  be
attributed  mainly  to inappropriate  macropolicies  (especially  exchange  rate
18  The  enactment  of a  Capital  Market  Law (in  1981)  and  the  establishment  of a
Capital  Market  Board  (1982)  were  among  the  conditions  of structural  adjust-
ment  lending  in  Turkey. Unfortunately  macroeconomic  conditions  did  not favor
the  growth  of the  market  and its  role  in  financing  private  investment
remained  minor.
19  Chile,  Jamaica  and  Malaysia  are  examples  of countries  where  bank deposits
have  benefited  from  a favorable  tax  status,  such  as exemption  from  withhold-
ing  tax  that  applies  to  securities,  so that  the  holding  of corporate  debt,
and  capital  market  development  in general  is  discouraged.  Removal  of this
distortion  was a feature  of the  reform  program  in  Jamaica.
20 There  is at  present  no consensus  on the  optimal  structure  of financial
intermediation  and  its  relationship  with capital  markets. Some  developed
countries,  notably  Germany  and  Japan,  have  done  well  with "bank-based"  sys-
tems  where  banks  and firms  have  close  relationships;  in  others,  the  system  is
"market-based"  with  more  of an arms-length  relationship  between  banks  and
firms. In some  countries  banks  are "universal";  in others,  financial  insti-
tutions  are  more specialized.  At the  risk  of over-generalization,  how  the
various  elements  of a financial  system  perform  is  probably  far  more important
than  the  precise  configuration  of the  system.
14policy),  but inadequate  prudential  supervision  and  regulation  was alao  to
blame. How  financial  reforms  should  be phased  in relation  to other  reforms
has therefore  become  an important  policy  question.
Mention  has already  been  made of the  possibility  that  macroeco-
nomic  and trade  policy  adjustment  can  have  undesirable  side-effects  for  the
financial  sector,  notably  in  worsening  the  condition  of the  portfolio  of
the  banking  system. 21 Conversely,  the  distortions  caused  by unduly  rigid
financial  regulation  can  be much  greater  in  the  absence  of  macroeconomic
balance. High inflation,  for  example,  can  cause  a fixed  nominal  interest
rate  to diverge  even  mere from  the  market  clearing  level  and  result  in
deteriorated  resource  allocation  and  a  worsening  of credit  rationing. 22
This  raises  difficult  issues  of phasing  and  sequencing  of differ-
ent  reforms:
A.  Some  consid_rations  argue  for  delay  in the  liberalization  of
financial  markets  until  other  aspects  of reform  are  implemented.
The  speed  and  magnitude  of the  response  of  a liberalized  financial
sector  to changes  in  the  environment  may  mean  that  some  firms  and
financial  institutions  which  could  have survived  under  a  more  con-
trolled  regime  will  fail  if the  system  is subjected  to a signifi-
cant  shock  to the  macro,  trade  or fiscal  policy  environment. 23
Abrupt  financial  sector  liberalization  can  itselt  generate  unde-
sirable  side-effects.  For  example,  if interest  rates  are  all
deregulated  at once,  the  (typically)  shorter  maturity  of deposits
21 It could  be argued  that  the  emergence  of this  problem  in  Turkey  in  the
early  1980s  could  have  been  anticipated  far  earlier  in the  SAL  program. Per-
haps  more should  have  been  done  to improve  auditing  and  bank  supervision  so
that  the  problem  could  at least  be monitored. By the  time  actions  of this
type  were introduced  (in the  financial  sector  operations  in  Turkey)  the  dam-
age  to  banks'  portfolios  was already  serious.
22 For  example,  fixed  rates  on  rural  lendirig  in  Brazil  resulted  in  large
losses  on official  credit  lines  as inflation  soared  following  the  breakdown
of the  cruzado.
23  In Chile,  for  example,  liberalizing  the  capital  account  of the  balance  of
payments  in an environment  of  market-determined  interest  rates  resulted  in  a
surge  in  the  external  value  of the  currency,  over-borrowing,  and  crisis  with
the  puncturing  of the  speculative  boom in  real  assets.
15than  loans  will imply  a severe  profitability  squeeze  for  banks.
This is  especially  acute  for  housing  loans,  because  of their  long
maturity 24. Unless  the  low  interest  rates  can  be renegotiated,
permanent  increases  in  the  level  of interest  rates  may imply  some
form  of state  subvention  if  depositors  are  to  be protected. Also,
an  easing  of the  fiscal  burden  on the  financial  system  will gener-
ally  result  in  pressure  on the  budget  which  may  manifest  itself  in
a distorting  tax  imposed  elsewhere  in the  economy  or inflation  or
explosive  issue  of  public  debc  which  further  raises  interest  rates
and  contributes  to financial  instability 25.
The  consensus  is  that  financial  sector  liberalization  is  best
introduced  at  a time  of  macroeconomic  and  policy  stability,  and
that  the  absence  of such  stability  can  frustrate  financial
reforms.
B. It  must,  however,  be recognized  that  every  delay  in  eliminating
distortions  represents  a real  loss  to the  economy  (via  the  adverse
effect  on resource  allocation)  and  also  the  buildup  of off-balance
sheet  government  liabilities.  Some  measures  to  promote  competi-
tion,  such  as opening  the  system  to foreign  banks,  might  be needed
to induce  reform  in an  oligopolistic  domestic  financial  system.
Nervousness  concerning  the  fragility  of the  financial  system
should  not  be used  as an  excuse  to  delay  reform  indefinitely.
Rather,  it should  be a spur  to ensuring  that  financial  reform  is
sufficiently  thoroughgoing  as to  result  in  robust  institutions.
In  practice,  the  timing  of financial  reforms  will  probably  follow
'windows  of opportunity"  (as,  for  example,  in  Argentina),  and the
possible  shocks  which  might  ari3e  in the  course  of other  likely
reforms  must  be factored  in.
24  Hungary  provides  one  example  where  a  very  high  proportion  of the  portfolio
of the  financial  system  is in the  form  of long-term  fixed  interest  housing
loans  which  are  now  well  below  market  levels.
25  The  Turkish  experience  shows  the  damaging  effects  of  high government  bor-
rowing  on the  stability  of the  domestic  financial  system.
163.2  Dissenting  Voices
As with  most issues  in  economic  policy,  there  are  some  who  feel
that  conventional  financial  sector  reforms  may  neglect  important  institu-
tional  considerations.
An important  general  point  is that  financial  sector  adjustment  may
be unsuccessful  or even  counterproductive  if  not supported  by adequate
macroeconomlc  policies.  Financial  policy  loans  have  been  made to coun-
tries  where  the  macro  situation  was  less  than  satisfactory, 26 despite  the
close  connection  between  the  macro  situation  and  the  health  of the
financial  sector. A review  of  experience  suggests  that  countries  have
generally  complied  with  the  specific  financial  policy  conditions  contained
in  the  loan.  Indeed,  some  governments  took  measures  which  went even  beyond
the  conditions  of the  loan. 27 But is  it realistic  to  expect  a favorable
result  when  macro-stability  is  not  being  achieved? 28 Some  argue  that
financial  sector  reforms  should  be deferred  until  a  more  stable  macroeco-
nomic  environment  can  be assured.
On financial  liberalization  there  are  various  strands  of  dissent.
Some  commentators  regard  the  hlgher  Interest  rates  which  would  result  from
liberalization  as likely  to  reduce  growth  and  increase  inflation  at least
in the  short-run. This is  an empirical  issue  which  is  not  wholly  resolved,
but evidence  is  against  the  dissenting  view,  at least  in the  long  run
context  (see  below). There  are  two  separate  issues  here,  first  whether
real  interest  rates  "overshoot"  or rise  to  unduly  high  levels  following
liberalization;  second,  whether  the  higher  interest  rates  do actually
depress  economic  activity  and  worsen  inflation.  The  experience  of the
26  Turkey  and  Argentina  faced  major  macro-imbalances  during  the  implementa-
tion  of financial  sector  reforms;  floods  and  a disastrous  earthquake  in  Ecu-
ador  during  early  1987  resulted  in an expansion  of the  fiscal  deficit  and  an
acceleration  of inflation. Implementation  of a financial  sector  reform  in
such  a sharply  worsened  environment  was clearly  going  to  be more  difficult.
27  There  are  examples  of this  in  the  case  of  Argentina  and  Ecuador. But
there  have  also  been  cases  where  reforms  have  subsequently  been  partially
reversed,  as with  the  financial  transactions  tax  in  Turkey,  reduced  from  fif-
teen  to three  per  cent,  but subsequently  increased.
28 For  example,  continuing  high  budgetary  deficits  in  Turkey  have  kept  real
interest  rates  high  and inhibited  recovery  of the  financial  sector  despite
the  sectoral  adjustment  measures. For  a discussion  of the  consequences,  see
Atiyas,  1989.
17Southern  Cone  countries,  and  especially  Chile,  in  the  late  1970s  is  often
mentioned  in this  connection. It is true  that  real  interest  rates  soared;
in  Chile  real  bank lending  rates  averaged  74  per  cent  over  the  four  years
1975-78. The  difficulty  lies  in isolating  the  role  of interest  rate  liber-
alization  in  a period  of extensive  policy  changes. Not  only  were tariff
reforms  and  an opening  of the  capital  account  undertaken  at  more or less
the  same  time  as liberalization  of the  domestic  financial  sector,  but inad-
equate  supervision  of financial  institutions  and  an  unsustainable  exchange
rate  policy  also  contributed. 29 Despite  the  rapid  growth  experienced  by
Chile  (and  Uruguay)  in  the  years  immediately  following  the  reforms,  the
financial  instability  which  ensued  remains  a specter  which  is  hard to exor-
cise  in  evaluating  financial  liberalization  for  other  countries. 30
An area  of  potential  zonflict  between  short-  and long-term  objec-
tives  is  monetary  control  and  anti-inflation  Dolicy. Structural  changes
which  substitute  market-based  monetary  policy  instruments  for  bank-by-bank
credit  ceilings  pose  potential  short-term  risks  for  monetary  control. It
should  in  principle  be possible  to  neutralize  any  undesired  side-effects  of
the  change  on macroeconomic  conditions,  but  lack  of  experience  in  the  oper-
ation  of the  new (mostly  indirect)  system  could  result  in  problems. An
adjusting  country  may  be operating  under  an IMF  program  which  was  drawn  up
in the  context  of the  existing,  unreformed,  financial  system,  and  it could
also  happen  that  there  was some  concern  to  retain  features  such  as credit
ceilings  despite  their  structural  inefficiency,  because  of a perception
that  they  allow  the  authorities  to  achieve  monetary  control  more  easily.
This  concern  may  make  reform  programs  less  ambitious  than  they  might  other-
wise  be.
A closely  related  point  is  the  controversial  theory  that,  in a
liberalized financial system, monetary  restraint  might be comparatively
29  McKinnon,  1988,  compares  financial  sector  reforms  in Chile  with  those  in
other  countries,  notably  in  Asia.
30 Though  interest  rates  in the  Philippines  also  jumped,  this  was  due  to the
poli:ical  crisis  and  devaluations  of 1983-84. There  had  been  an interval  of
stabilitv  following  the  interest  rate  liberalization,  which  therefore  cannot
be blamed  for  the  later  disturbances.  Indeed  it  can  be argued  that  the  cri-
sis  would  have  been  even  deeper  and  more  prolonged  had the  authorities  not
had at their  disposal  a flexible  interest  rate  regime.
18ineffective  (or  even  counterproductive)  in restoring  balance  in Interna-
tional  current  payments  and  the  macroeconomy  in  general. In this  neo-
structuralist  view,  monetary  restraint  might  choke  off  production  as  much
as,  or even  more than  demand. It is  argued  that,  in 2  system  of  directed
credit,  monetary  restraint  could  be confined  mainly  to less  productive  sec-
tors  or consumer  spending. This  line  of argument  is  particularly  relevant
to the  short-run,  and  it Is  weakened  if  fiscal  policy  instruments  more
arpropriate  to  achieving  macroeconomic  balance  are  available.
Among  the  financial  instruments  which  the  Bank  has  always  sought
to expand  in developing  _ountries  are  long-term  loans. 31 But is the  provi-
sion  of long-term  loans  really  so  vital? If it  were,  one  might,  for
example,  expect  to see  long-term  resources  made  available  from  World  Bank
funds  commanding  much  higher  interest  rates  than  short-term  loans. It
seems  likely  that  unsatisfied  demand  for  long  term  loans  comes  mainly  from
less  credit-worthy  clients. Top-grade  borrowers  might  feel  reasonably  con-
fident  of  being  able  to roll-over  short-term  bank  borrowing  and  not  be
prepared  to pay  much of a  premium  for  long-term  funds. Prepare  ness  to  pay
a maturity  premium  thus  could  signal  low  creditworthiness,  making  a compet-
itive  banking  system  reluctant  to  make  long-term  loans  to a  broader  spec-
trum  of clients,  even  at  a premium. The  advantages  to a  bank  of being  able
tn  review  and  recall  loans  at regular  intervals  should  not  be minimized.
Early  evidence  of a  borrower's  deteriorating  position  can  be acted  upon
promptly,  possibly  allowing  the  position  to  be turned  around,  whereas  the
holder  of a long-term  claim  may  have  no comparable  sanction.
More generally,  it  is sometimes  held that  the  financial  system
will not  on its  own  channel  funds  to  the  most  socially,  as  opposed  to
privately,  productive  sectors. In  particular,  are  we convinced  that  a
"sound  and  totally  liberalized"  financial  system  is  always  the  most  desir-
able  for  development?  What  of second  best  conslderations,  for  example
where  a poor  legal  framework  in a  volatile  economy  leads  the  formal  sector
to only  consider  short-term,  heavily  collateralized  lending  and  inhibits
31  Among  the  policy  measures  adopted  to  encourage  this,  apart  from  the  estab-
lishment  of specialized  DFIs in  numerous  countries,  has  been the  differenti-
ation  of reserve  requirements  and  lower  taxes  in  respect  of long-term
resources  in the  Philippines  and  other  countries.
19equity  markets? 32 A conventional  response  to this  point  is that  deviation$
between  social  and  privi-te  valuationis  are  best  met  with  explicit  tax/sub-
sidy  measures. Using  directed  credit  can  conceal  a  very large  implicit
subsidy  which,  if  made  explicit,  would  be seen  to  be  well in  excess  of the
difference  between  social  and  private  valuations.  The  use  of subsidized
credit  also  usually  involves  high  leakages  because  of fungibility.  But
this  is  only  a partial  response. To the  extent  that  what is  being identi-
fied  is  an institutional  failure,  as  with the  absence  of certain  financial
instruments,  it  may  well  be that  the  best  cure  lies  partly  ir.  policy
interventions  in the  financial  sector. But  this  does  not necessarily  argue
for  piograms  and  institutions  of types  common  at present.
Theoreticians  have  observed  that  partlal  liberalization  of a for-
mal  banking  system  may  actually  worsen  the  supply  of credit  to the  produc-
tive  sector  to  the  extent  that  it  diverts  deposits  from  a curb  market  which
may  be more  efficient  in channeling  its  deposit  resources  to the  productive
sector. This  argument  seems  to  be based  mainly  on a reading  of the  Korean
experience,  where  curb  markets  are  extensive  and  are  not subject  to reserve
requirements  like  the  formal  banking  system. It is  not evident  that  curb
markets  are  generally  more  efficient  than  the  formal  banking  system  that
this  point  might  have  application;  the  use  of unregulated  intermediaries
also increases  the  risks  of crisis. 33
It  has  also  been  remarked  that  taxation,  explicit  and implicit,  of
financial  intermediation  could  be used  to  offset  the  adverse  effects  of
cartelization  and  monopoly  power  in  the  banking  system. If the  authorities
are faced  with a situation  where  banks  are  able  to depress  deposit  rates
and increase  lending  rates  unduly,  skilful  use  of unremunerated  reserve
requirements  might  offset  these  distortions. 34 The  ideal  long-run  solution
32 This  point  has  been  much  discussed  in the  context  of the  Philippines.
Investor  confidence  was  badly  jolted  by the  celebrated  Dewey  Dee  affair,
where  a  prominent  financier  suddenly  absconded  leaving  large  money  market
debts  behind  him.  It is  to fill  this  perceived  gap  that  many  see  the  proper
role  of DFIs,  not  only in  the  Philippines,  but in  many  other  countries,  not-
ably in  sub-Saharan  Africa. If the  gap  is an imaginary  one, then  not  only
the  role,  but also  the  viability  of DFIs  is  placed  in question.
33  For  the  example  of Malaysia  see  Sheng,  1988.
34  In Ghana,  for  instance,  the  interaction  of  credit  ceilings  and  an inflow
of funds  from  abroad  resulted  in  a situation  where  banks  were able  to  command
a very  high spread  between  borrowing  and  lending  rates.
20in such  circumstances  is,  of  course,  to  encourage  greater  competition
through  liberal  (though  prudent)  policies  towards  entry  of new  banks;  but
the  results  of such  a program  may  be slow. Furthermore,  to the  extent  that
economies  of scale  exist  in  financial  intermediation 35 some  degree  of
monopoly  power  may remain  even  if  entry  is free.
In the  case  of Insolvent  state-owned  banks,  one  line  of dissent
takes  the  form  of suggesting  that  immediate  action  to reveal  the  poor
quality  of the  loan  portfolio  and  clean-up  the  balance  sheet  may  be unnec-
essary  and imprudent.  Unnecessary  because  the  fear  of a  bank run  may  not
be great  in the  case  of state-owned  banks  and  because  changing  the
management  may  be sufficient  to  avoid  a  recurrence  of the  poor  lending
policies. Imprudent  because  announcement  of the  insolvency  may damage
business  confidence,  diminish  the  chances  of good  recovery  on doubtful
loans,  and  present  the  government  with a  budgetary  commitment  which  it can
ill  afford  to absorb  in  the  short  run. The  choice  between  the  orthodox  and
dissenting  view  here  hinges  on the  likely  success  of an attempt  to cover  up
the  insolvency  and  on the  likely  effectiveness  of a  bank  management  encum-
bered  with  a  balance  sheet  so  bad  as to  make  profitability  unattainable  for
years.
The  best Institutional  arrangements  for  ensuring  an  adequate
implementation  of monetary  policy  and  prudential  regulation  and  for  dealing
with failed  banks  are  often  the  subjecc  of discussion.  Should  these  func-
tions  be united  under  one  institution  - say  the  central  bank - or is  a
separation  of functions  desirable?  Also,  should  insurance  intermediaries
and  the  securities  markets  have  their  own  regulators,  or does  the  need for
coordination  argue  for  a single  regulatory  body?
The  experience  in  different  countries  is  very  varied,  and  this  is
as it  should  be,  bearing  in  mind  for  instance  the  vga.ying  degree  of com-
plexity  of the  financial  systems,  and  the  resources  wvich  can  be made
available  to the  implementation  of financial  system o'Licy.  Many  countries
accept  the  importance  of a  degree  of independence  of .he  monetary  policy
35  This itself  is  a  much  debated  question.
21authority  from  other  aspects  of government,  though  the  degree  of indepen-
dence  varies. 36 The responsibility  for  bank supervision  is sometimes  given
to the  central  bank,  sometimes  to a  government  ministry. In some  countries
there  is  a separate  superintendency  of banks. To the  extent  that  this  is
needed  to  ensure  that  sufficient  attention  is devoted  to prudential  super-
vision  in the  face  of competing  demands  on the  attention  of senior  central
bank or  ministry  officials,  there  can  be merit  in  having  a separate
superintendency.  But  whatever  institutional  arrangement  is  preferred,  it
is essential  that  the  bank supervision  function  be adequately  funded,  and
that  there  be an adequate  two-way  flow  of information  between  it  and  the
monetary  policy  function. 37 The  case  for  a separate  agency  with the
authority  to intervene  and  deal  with  failed  or failing  banks  has already
been  mentioned.
The  importance  of coordinating  prudential  regulation  in  different
segments  of the  financial  system  grows  with increased  liberalization  of the
financial  markets. There  is  a tension  between,  on the  one  hand,  the
requirements  of coordination  and,  on the  other  hand,  the  need for  special-
ized  agencies  with  clearly  defined  and  focussed  priorities.
There  is  also  discussion  as to  whether  a formal  deposit  Insurance
scheme  is really  desirable,  and  as to  what  form  it should  take.  Should
such  insurance  be compulsory? Insurance  of deposits  eliminates  the  incen-
tive  for  depositors  to satisfy  themselves  as to the  prudence  with  which  the
financial  institution  is  being  managed  and  makes  them  indifferent  even  to
reckless  management  behavior. An insurance  fund  is rarely  sufficient  to
meet  'or  calls  upon it.  Limitation  of insurance  to small  deposits  is
routin_ly  sidestepped  by such  practices  as deposit  splitting. Alternative
approaches  which  might  restore  incentives,  such  as relating  the  insurance
premium  to the  regulator's  perception  of the  risk  of the  portfolio,  are  not
easily  effected,  especially  in developing  countries.  The  main  response  to
this  line  of criticism  is  to observe  that,  as  ex post  indemnification  of
36  Perhaps  the  greatest  degree  of independence  is  provided  by adherance  to a
multi-country  currency  zone,  such  as the  CFA  zones  in  Africa,  where  the  cen-
tral  banks,  being  international  institutions,  are  not  answerable  to any  one
government.
37 It  should  go almost  without  saying  that  supervision  must  be completely
free  of improper  pressures  from  prominent  personages.
22depositors  has  been  widespread,  the  problem  of  moral  hazard  already  exists
and  that  explicit  insurance  is  preferable  to implicit,  not  least  because  it
provides  a "lever"  for  regulators  to intervene.
Another  debatable  issue  is  the  extent  to  which  a financial  system
can  be  made to  be self-regulating  by mandating  extensive  dlsclosure  of
information  by the  constitutions  and  the  regulators,  and  relying  on depos-
itors  to  police  the  banks. For  various  reasons,  such  an  approach  is  not
generally  thought  to  be robust. However,  this  forms  the  philosophical
basis  of the  most  comprehensive  banking  reform  undertaken  in  a developing
country,  that  of Chile. 38
While  the  introduction  of universal  banklng  has  been  recommended
in  some  bank  programs 39 there  is the  view that  allowing  barks  to  become
involved  in  corporate  securities  weakens  prudential  safeguards  as  well  as
obstructs  the  development  of autonomous  capital  markets. This  conflict
mirrors  the  long-standing  debate  between  adherents  of the  traditional  Japa-
nese/German  approach  to  banking  and  the  UK/US  approach. By now,  however,
it  seems  clear  that  attempts  to  retain  rigid  barriers  between  segments  of
the  financial  sector  can  have,  at  best,  a finite  lifetime.
All in  all,  the  dissenting  voices  serve  to  call  attention  to  the
need for  reforms  to  be carefully  thought  through  and  to  the  need for  atten-
tion  to  be paid  to the  specific  institutional  features  of each  country.
3.3  Winners  and  Losers
Achieving  consensus  on financial  sector  reforms  is  usually  diffi-
cult  because  of the  powerful  special  interests  who  are  affected. 40 A
highly  regulated  banking  system  is typically  a  cartelized  and  potentially
profitable  one. Opening  up competition  will  erode  excessive  profits  and
38 Note  that  the  Chilean  system  also  mandates  an  active  role  for  the  bank
superintendency.
39  An early  example  was  the  Philippines.
40 This  is true  for  all  policy  reforms; spurred  on by a  massive  insolvency
crisis,  some  financial  reforms  have  been  more  easily  accomplished  than,  for
example,  tariff  reforms.
23allow  new institutions  and  markets  to flourish  at the  expense  of the  old.
Anticipation  of such  effects  will  result  in  strong  lobbies  against  liberal-
ization.
There  are  losers  too  from  the  establishment  of tighter  prudential
regulation.  Uncreditworthy  borrowers  who  received  loans  from  badly  managed
banks  will  no longer  have access  to credit. The  very  fact  that  they  have
received  loans  in the  past  suggests  that  they  will  form  a  powerful  lobby
against  reform. In  most developing  countries,  major  banks  and  borrowers
have  extensive  ties;  moving  to  an "arms-length"  relationship  attacks  the
basis  of the  economic  power  structure  and  is  therefore  slow  and  difficult.
It is often  asserted  that  financial  liberalization  will  have
favorable  effects  on income  distribution  and  on reducing  the  concentration
of economic  power. There  is  probably  something  to this,  though  the  evi-
dence  is  not  fully  conclusive.  Credit  allocation  is  normally  more  concen-
trated  thin  the  holding  of deposits,  and  it tends  to follow  the
distribution  of assets  available  for  collateral. 41 Many  examples  suggest
that  subsidized  credit  is in  practice  mostly  available  to  the  larger  or
more  prosperous  segments  of the  targeted  sectors. Small  savers  benefit
from  the  liberalization  of deposit  rates. The  very  poor  have  little  or  no
access  to formal  credit;  their  interests  lie  in the  improvement  of economic
growth  and  employment  which  may  be expected  to flow  from  reform,  which  may
also  end  the  artificial  stimulus  to capital-intensive  productior.  from
severely  negative  interest  rates.
At the  same  time  it  cannot  be neglected  that  drastic  changes  in
interest  rates  can  have  very large  distributional  effects  to the  extent
that  they  affect  long-term  loans. This  is  especially  important  in  respect
of  housing  credit  which  is  heavily  subsidized  in  many  countries. Middle-
class  borrowers  may  have  entered  into  long-term  commitments  wholly  unaware
of the  fact  that  the  interest  rates  which  they  have  been  offered  are
subject  to large  increase  if  the  subsidies  are  removed. Even  though  these
borrowers  have  gained  substantially  from  the  subsidy,  they  may  be unable  to
meet their  commitments  at the  unsubsidized  rate. In practice  both  equity
41 For  an interesting  analysis  of the  impact  of collateral  on  credit  alloca-
tion  and  thence  on efficiency,  see  Feder,  1988.
24and  political  considerations  may  call  for  some  degree  of partial  compensa-
tion  for  long-term  borrowers  especially  badly-hit  by a change  in the  inter-
est  rate  regime. But  such  schemes  of compensation  must  be strictly
circumscribed  if  the  benefits  of the  reform  are  not  to  be lost:  certainly
the  new interest  rates  must  apply  to  all  new  borrowing  and  the  scheme  of
compensation  should  be simple,  transparent,  and  preferably  funded  out  of
fiscal  resources.
Given  the  sensitivity  of the  issues  addressed,  governments  and  the
Bank  sometimes  prefer  to leave  implicit  some  of the  steps  which  may  need  to
be taken,  and  these  may,  accordingly,  not  be in loan  documents. As with
other  policy  based  loans,  the  chances  of full  implementation  are  best  when
government  is firmly  committed  to  reform;  in  this  case  some  actions  may
well  have  preceded  the  loan. On thc  other  hand,  expectation  of a series  of
sectoral  adjustment  loans,  which  promise  continued  balance  of  payments  sup-
port,  may  have  induced  a tendency  to  be satisfied  with  conditionality  in
any  one loan  which  falls  short  of  what  is  both  feasible  and  desirable.
4  The  Success  or Potential  of Financial  Adjustment  Policies
4.1  Financial  Policies  and  Growth
The  ultimate  objective  of financial  sector  reform  is  a  higher  sus-
tained  rate  of economic  growth. Measuring  success  in these  terms,  however,
is compromised  by the  multitude  of  other  factors  which  contribute  to
economic  growth. The  effectiveness  of financial  sector  reforms  needs  to  be
addressed  also ir.  terms  of intetw3diate  objectives.  For  example,  has
interest  rate  liberalization  contributed  to a  higher  savings  rate,  to a
higher  rate  of monetization,  or to reduced  capital  outflow? Has  removal  of
sectoral  credit  controls  led  to  more  productive  investment  choices? Has
removal  of  bank-by-bank  credit  restrictions  reduced  bank  margins? Have
programs  of  bank  rehabilitation  and  improved  supervision  resulted  in  a
sound  and  energetic  banking  system? Has the  elimination  of  programs  of
directed  credit  resulted  in  reduced  loan  delinquencies?  Have structural
improvements  in capital  markets  led  to increased  recourse  to the  capital
market?
25In  most cases  the  adjustment  programs  developed  by the  Bank  have
not  run  long  enough  to  provide  anything  like  definitive  answers  to these
questions  on a  case  by case  basis. From  the  cases  reviewed,  it does  seem
that  countries  have  complied  with  most  of the  conditions  of the  programs. 42
But,  being  quick-disbursing,  policy-based  operations,  the  programs  have
also  sometimes  been introduced  in  problematical  macro-circumstances  which
have  continued  through  loan  implementation.
More  generally,  the  degree  to  which  an efficient  financial  system
can  contribute  to  the  process  of economic  growth  is  nnt  precisely  estab-
lished. Certainly,  a well-performing  financial  system  is  no substitute  for
policy  weakness  elsewhere  in the  economy. Nevertheless,  when things  go
wrong  in  the  financial  system,  such  as  with  a  hyperinflation  or - more
relevant  in  the  present  context  - widespread  bank failures,  the  impact  on
the  economy  can  be sudden  and  dramatic  and  long-lived.  Recent  research  on
the  1930s  depression  in the  US attaches  considerable  importance  to the
impact  of  bank failures  on credit  availability  (independent  of the  defla-
tionary  effect  of  monetary  contraction).  Cause  and  effect  have  been  diffi-
cult  to disentangle  in some  of the  developing  country  episodes  of financial
insolvency  in that  the  insolvency  of the  banks  became  evident  at a time  of
recession.
Some  indirect  evidence  may  be obtained  by cross-sectional  examina-
tion  of countries  which  vary in  their  structure  - some  approximating  the
ideal  of liberalization  programs,  some  very  repressed.  The  relative
contribution  of liberalized  and  repressed  financial  systems  to  economic
growth  has  been considered  in  a number  of statistical  studies. 43 In  an IMF
review  of 21 countries  over  the  period  1971-80,  the  six  countries  with
positive  real  interest  rates  grew  more  rapidly  than  the  ten  with  moderately
negative  rates  which,  in  turn,  had  average  growth  rate  well  above  the  five
42 Further,  examination  of  the  Chilean  case  suggests  that  financial  sector
reform  can  have such  beneficient  effect  if  the  macroeconomic  situation  is
kept  under  control. Real interest  rates  and  bank spreads  have  moderated  and
real  volume  of deposits  and  bank  credit  grown  since  the  reforms,  to support
rapid  growth  of output.
43 Fry,  1988,  and  Gonzales  Arrieta,  1988.
26with severely  negative  rates. A recent  study  by one  of the  present
authors,  using  data  for  34 countries  1965-84  also  finds  a positive  impact
of interest  rates  on growth. 44
Evidence  on the  impact  of distortions  caused  by directed  credit  is
even  less  easily  quantified,  essentially  because  of fungibility  which  makes
it  very  difficult  to assess  what  would  have  happened  in  the  absence  of
directed  credit. Few,  if  any,  studies  exist  which  conclusively  attribute
favorable  results  to  programs  of directed  credit. Institutions  implement-
ing  directed  credit  programs  have  faced  serious  loan  quality  problems  in
many countries,  which  suggests  poor  credit  allocation.  But  even  where
directed  and  subsidized  credit  proves  profitable  for  the  financial  interme-
diary,  it  may  be socially  loss-making,  to the  extent  that  it  results  in
diversion  of funds  from  still  more  worthwhile  projects. 45
4.2  The  Structure  of Financial  Loans
A policy-based  loan  has the  effect  of financing  part  of the  bor-
rowing  country's  international  payments  deficit,  as  well as  supporting  the
budget  through  the  provision  of counterpart  funds. 46 A typical  financial
reform  policy  loan  might  be disbursed  against  general  imports  over  a period
of two  years  in two  tranches. Counterpart  domestic  funds  are  generated  as
importers  turn  in  domestic  currency  for  foreign  exchange;  what then  happens
44  Gelb,  1989.  This  study  identifies  a  causal  chain  from  higher  interest
rates,  through  greater  mobilization  of saving  through  the  financial  system,
to increased  efficiency  of investment  and  thereby  to  growth. Analyses  also
suggest  that  high  deposit  interest  rates  encourage  additional  saving  in
developing  countries  (notably  in  Asia),  but  that  the  effect  is  very  small.
There  are  a number  of clear-cut  examples  of the  effect  of real  interest  rate
increases  on monetization;  often  this  seems  to  have  been attributable  to  a
reflow  of funds  previously  held  outside  the  country.
45  Korea  is  sometimes  mentioned  as  a counter-example,  for  that  country
experienced  rapid  growth  even  though  a selective  credit  policy  was  in opera-
tion. But it  should  be noted  that  in  Korea  a rapid  growth  in the  uncon-
trolled  financial  curb  market  substantially  offset  the  impact  of this  policy
on the  overall  distribution  of credit. A more  conventional  story  is  that  of
Indonesia,  where  a system  of administrative  allocation  of credit  was intro-
duced  in  1974 (and  abandoned  in  1983). Despite  the  hlgher  rate  of investment
which  was  experienced  in Indonesia  after  1974,  the  growth  rate  of output
actually  declined,  suggesting  that  investment  had  not  been especially  well-
directed.
46 For  discussion  of counterpart  funds  and  the  relationship  with  monetary
policy,  see  Roemer,  1988.
27depends  on  how government  uses these  payments. For  example,  it  may  retire.
domestic  debt;  after  disbursement  goQ'ernment  then  has a foreign  liability
and  a domestic  asset  (or  reduced  domestic  liability)  and  the  private  sector
has a domestic  debt (or  reduced  asset)  and  foreign  goods. The  question
naturally  arises  as to  what  costs  are  being  covered  by the  funds  disbursed
in  financial  sector  loans. The  major  fiscal  costs  of financial  sector
reforms  are  of two  types:
(i)  In  a repressed  financial  system,  high,  unremunerated  reserve
requirements  may  yield  government  the  annual  equivalent  of 2-3%  of
GDP  and lowered  debt  servicing  charges  from  repressed  interest
rates  on  public  debt  may  amount  to  a further  percentage  or two. A
move to financial  liberalization  which  substantially  removes  the
financial  system  out  of the  tax  base  may  therefore  have  apprecia-
ble fiscal  cost,  especially  in  pre ent  value  terms. The  fisc  may
also  need  to  bear  some  cost  in  compensating  for  the  elimination  of
interest  cross-subsidization. 47
(ii)  A second  fiscal  cost  component  comes  with  financial  restruc-
turing,  as depositors  and/or  debtors  are  bailed  out. As the  expe-
rience  of Chile  and  the  Philippines  suggests,  this  one-off  cost
can  represent  as  much  as 20-30%  of one  year's  GDP.  But  it  can  be
spread  out  over  time,  for  example,  if  the  government  provides
intermediaries  with  interest-bearing  paper  in exchange  for  the  bad
portfolio  to  enable  depositors  to  be serviced. 48
Compared  with these  two  components,  the  fiscal  costs  of institu-
tional  changes,  such  as introducing  external  auditing,  are  naturally  small.
The  major  cost  of such  actions  can  be a political  one, inasmuch  as they
47  This  has  been  a notable  factor  in the  case  of  Turkey. In the  Philippines,
by contrast,  the  higher  interest  rates  of 1984  probably  contributed  to gov-
ernment  revenue.
48  Of course,  in  the  absence  of restructuring  government  would  incur  costs
also  (as  well  as the  buildup  of claims  due  to  weakening  institutions)  because
subsidies  will  be needed  to sustain  the  liquidity  of insolvent  intermedi-
aries.
28affect  powerful  interest  groups. Financial  sector  reforms  of the  type
being  discussed  do  not typically  have important  direct  foreign  exchange
costs.49
The  counterpart  funds  from  Bank  loans  for  financial  reforms  are
usually  not  closely  related  to the  fiscal  costs  of financial  policy  reforms
nor to the  time-profile  of such  costs. Such  loans  may therefore  cover  only
a  part of the  fiscal  costs  (Philippines,  Chile,  Ghana)  or more  than  the
fiscal  costs  (Turkey)  depending  on the  loan  size  and  the  nature  of the
policy  reforms. The  loans  will  generally  far  exceed  any  direct  foreign
exchange  costs  of the  reforms.
Bearing  in  mind that  balance-of-payments  considerations  have  con-
siderable  weight  in  determining  loan  amounts,  it  seems  that  the  nature  of
financial  sector  reforms  does  not  provide  a good  yardstick  for  judging  the
appropriate  size  of policy-based  loans. Should  loans  therefore  be designed
to  establish  a tighter  link  between  disbursements  and  fiscal  costs? In the
present  context,  this  would  mean:  (i)  severely  reducing  the  size  of
tranches  linked  to the  reform  of  accounting  and  auditing  practices  etc.,
(ii)  linking  disbursements  to  market  liberalization  (but  only  to  ease
adjustment  to  a  better  fiscal  system:  there  is little  point  in reducing
taxes  on financial  transactions  only  to  have taxes  raised  in other  distort-
ing  ways,  e.g.  on exports),  and (iii)  establishing  a link  between  disburse-
ment  and  the  fiscal  costs  incurred  in  the  process  of financial
restructuring. 50 This  has implications  for  the  speed  of disbursement  which
are  noted  below.
The  disbursement  of financial  intermediation  loans,  on the  other
hand,  depends  on the  speed  of  disbursement  of the  corresponding  credit
lines  to final  borrowers, 51 even  when such  loans  include  policy  reform  as a
49 It might  be argued,  however,  that  if depositors  were to  suffer  losses  they
would  reduce  their  spending  on imports  as well  as on  domestic  output. If  so,
a recapitalisation  of the  banking  system,  which  protects  deposits,  could  be
said  to  have indirect  foreign  exchange  costs.
50  The  second  FSAL  to  Turkey  set  aside  a component  specifically  for  restruc-
turing,  which  would  link  disbursements  with  the  cost  of system  reform.
51  Note,  however,  that  the  term  of the  Bank  loan  is typically  far  longer  than
the  terms  of the  loans  offered  to final  users  of funds,  and  that  there  may  be
no requirement  that  domestic  repayments  be relent  again  up to the  term  of the
bank  loan.  In such  cases,  the  Bank  loan  initially  -unds  the  private  sector,
but later  it funds  government.
29condition. As noted  above,  the  policy  content  of financial  intermediation
loans  has  been limited,  typically  to the  raising  of subsidized  interest
rates. Raising  these  interest  rates  is  often  necessary  so that  lines  of
credit  disbursed  on terms  acceptable  to  the  Bank  will  not  be undercut  by
cheaper  domestic  lines. This introduces  a link  between  policy  reform  and
disbursement,  but  it is implicit  rather  than  explicic.
4.3  Some  Practical  Issues  In  Financial  Loans
1.  It  may  not  be realistic  to  expect  the  "real"  economy  to  be reformed
prior  to a financial  sector  operation,  but  financial  policy  loans  must  be
part  of a  viable  package. They  need  to  be designed  in  the  context  of an
adequate  macro-policy  framework  if  they  are  not  to  misfire,  or even  result
in  deferral  of  needed  macro-adjustment.
2.  It is  essential  to ensure  that  the  granting  of  a large  and  quick
disbursing  financial  sector  loan  does  not  result  in  a deferral  or slowing
of other  measures  needed  to  ensure  lasting  macroeconomic  adjustment.
Adherence  to specified  macroeconomic  conditionality  should  be required  for
the  disbursement  of financial  sector  adjustment  loans.
3.  Should  the  size  and  disbursement  of loans  be linked  to fiscal  costs  of
policy  reforms? As noted  above,  this  would  require  large  changes  in the
type  of loan  from  that  now  established.  Major  disbursements  would  be
linked  to the  adjustment  costs  of fiscal  reforms  and  to restructuring  only,
with small  components  of  a technical  assistance  nature  for  reforming  the
financial  "infrastructure".  It  would  be perhaps  necessary  to supplement
this  by an  explicit  balance-of-payments  component,  with  its  own  appropriate
conditionality.
4.  In cases  where  the  "financial  infrastructure"  is  deficient,  is it
realistic  to  expect  rapid  results  from  reforms? Banks  may  never  have  had
to develop  the  credit  processes  appropriate  for  a  market  economy,  and it is
known  that  deep  institutional  reforms  take  time. How  soon  can  we expect  a
change  in the  banking  culture  of a country? On the  side  of supervision,  it
takes  at least  five  years  to train  a  bank  examiner. Legal  reforms  may  also
take  time,  especially  in  countries  with a  division  of  powers  between  execu-
tive  and  legislative  branches. The  experience  of Chile  and  the  Philippines
shows  how slow  and  difficult  it  can  be to  dilute  ownership  links  between
30banks  and  firms. In such  cases,  quick-disbursing  policy  based  operations
may  not  be ideal. It  may  be better  to  consider  smaller  technical  assis-
tance  packages  disbursing  over  periods  of about  five  years  to  be complem-
ented  by larger,  quick-disbursing,  loans  at the  time  of financial
restructuring.
5.  The  adverse  consequences  for  bank  portfolios  (i.e.  for  the 'stocks'  of
asset  value)  of adjustment  measures  to redirect  "flows"  of factors  and
goods,  (notably  exchange  rate  adjustments  and  trade  liberalization)  are  not
sufficiently  taken  into  account  in  planning  such  policy  reforms. They
should  be anticipated  and  measures  be taken  to  prepare  for  them.  For
example,  bank regulation  and  supervision  could  be addressed  at an early
stage,  rather  than  waiting  for  the  problems  to  multiply.
6.  Towards  what  kind  of financial  system  should  we  be trying  to  restruc-
ture?  In  particular,  what  role  should  development  banks  play in the more
liberalized  systems  of the  future? If this  question  is  not thought
through,  the  restructured  banks  may face  a long-run  earnings  problem  and
quickly  become  distres.sed  again. 52
7.  Given  the  very  poor financial  condition  of  banking  systems  in  many
countries  (and  the  adverse  implications  for  resource  allocation  that  fol-
low)  should  the  volume  of financial  intermediation  loans  increase  rapidly?
Is there  a danger  of further  weakening  the  system  by piling  still  more  debt
onto  undercapitalized  borrowers? Given  the  poor  history  of directed
credit,  at least  in  terms  of repayments,  is  debt  the  right  instrument  to
foster  development?  Can  equity  or  pseudo-equity  contracts  be used instead,
to  strengthen  capital  structures?  How  would  such  a  move  be compatible  with
the  lending  policies  of the  Bank?
5  Conclusion
The typical  financial  sector  reform  package  involves  policy  changes
to increase  the  power  of centralized  decisionmaking  in some  areas  and  to
reduce  it  in others. In the  area  of prudential  regulation  and  supervision,
reforms  seek  strengthened  information  systems,  stronger  and  more  detailed
52  This issue  is  now  being  faced  by at least  one  large  institution  restruc-
tured  according  to  a Bank  program.
31regulations and closer central supervision.  At the level of the intermedi-
aries, reforms seek improved procedures, some of which, such as credit poli-
cies, loan review and management information systems, are natural complements
to improvements at central level.  But insofar as the relative cost and
availability of credit are concerned, the typical reform program calls for a
reduction in governm-nt control, and also tries to broaden the range of
options for finance.
The internal consistency of policy packages of this type follows from
the assumptions which underlie the market economy model, especially that the
qualities of goods and services  must be reasonably apparent to participants
in the market who can only then formulate their production and spending plans
in an appropriate way.  Liberalizing the financial market without ensuring a
correspondence between financial contracts and the values and productivity of
the real assets underlying the contracts does not contribute to the strength-
ening of market mechanisms and may even undermine them, as indicated by the
experience of more than one country.  It is, of course, possible for a
pendulum to swing too far, and in several directions.  For example, given
deep-seated information shortcomings and macroinstability problems, a fully
market-based financial system might sometimes usefully be complemented, from
a developmental perspective, by measures to encourage certain types of
financing.  If carried too far, prudential regulation can conceivably
strangle financial innovation.  An exclusive drive for privatization can
cause much-needed public-sector reforms to be neglected.  However, given the
starting  positions of the financial systems in  most developing countries,
financial reforms in the indicated  directions are vital for strengthening the
role of the market in allocating resources,  both internally and internation-
ally.  They will also be needed if developing countries are to take advantage
of the globalization of finance  which is currently  under way.
How should financial sector operations evolve?  This paper has tried
to extract some implications of past experience.  Many needed financial sec-
tor reforms are of an institutional and "infrastructural"  nature, and require
the acquisition of scarce skills.  They take time to  become effective, and it
is not clear that a quick-disbursing  policy-based operation is the ideal
medium for effecting them.  It might therefore  be better to formulate medium-
term, lower-intensity operations for certain components of financial sector
reform.  Given the close links between financial sector policies and
performance and the  macroeconomic situation, the latter needs to be taken
32into account when planning reforms, especially when these have fiscal impli-
cations.  The implications of other reforms, such as that of trade, for the
financial system, need to  be considered at an earlier stage than has so far
been the case.  Disbursement of financial reform loans could be tied in more
closely to the costs of the reforms, which would be primarily those of
restructuring and fiscal adjustment.  And, as with other reforms, if finan-
cial reforms are not embraced intellectually  by the governments of adjusting
countries, they  will be adopted reluctantly and will surely fail.
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